Abstract. The much celebrated LLL algorithm, in contrast to its short and simple code, exhibits highly enigmatic behavior; and in contrast to its broad usage, and the numerous breakthroughs it has sparked since 1982, our understanding so far of its inner workings has been completely in the dark. In this paper, we develop and present an illuminating mathematical framework to think about LLL, which at once clearly explains most of its well-known peculiarities. More precisely, we establish, with compelling theoretical and experimental evidence, that LLL behaves essentially identically to a certain stochastic variant of the sandpile model that we introduce here. The once mysterious properties of LLL then turn out to be natural, familiar ones in the realm of the sandpiles. We also make a couple of new discoveries on the sandpile side along the way, which may be of some interest to the researchers working in that area.
1. Introduction 1.1. The problem and its history. The Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovász (LLL) algorithm [20] can been seen as an extension of the ancient Euclid algorithm and the medieval Gauss algorithm to general dimensional lattices, where the Euclid algorithm computes the greatest common divisor of two integers, and the Gauss algorithm computes a minimal basis of a two-dimensional lattice. Initially, the LLL algorithm was designed for factoring a polynomial over rational field in polynomial time, and then it has been applied to various problems in mathematics, particularly computational number theory [9] . Moreover, the LLL algorithm can give an approximated solution for solving NP-hard problems (e.g. the subset sum problem) in polynomial time, and thus it has also provided many fruitful applications in computer science such as cryptography [28] , coding theory [10] , and optimization problem [1] . These days the LLL algorithm has become a fundamental tool for mathematics and computer science.
In cryptography particularly, the LLL algorithm plays a fundamental role for evaluating the security of public-key cryptosystems. The LLL-exploited key recovery attack against the widely used RSA cryptosystem is evaluated by [11] . The security of post-quantum cryptography based on the hardness of solving the approximate shortest vector problem in lattices -called lattice-based cryptography -has been estimated by a variant of the LLL algorithm [30] .
Ever since its advent in 1982, the numerous practitioners of LLL have been puzzled by the curious phenomenon that there exists such a conspicuous gap between the actual performance of LLL and what could be said of it theoretically. It has been a well-known theorem from the original LLL paper [20] that the worst-case length of the shortest vector of an LLL-reduced basis is proportional to (4/3) n−1 4 ≈ 1.075 n , where n is the rank of the basis, and that this bound is sharp. It has been just as well-known that LLL in practice yields ≈ 1.02 n almost all the time, except in some special cases in which, actually, it does even better. (The numbers 1.075 and 1.02 are called root Hermite factors (RHF), which is the standard way of measuring the output quality of lattice reduction algorithms such as LLL: the lower its average RHF is, the stronger is the algorithm.)
It is surprising and puzzling that there exist very few papers that attempt to understand the hidden mathematics behind this intriguing phenomenon of such an important algorithm. Even a numerical assessment of the performance of LLL came relatively recently [27] , which is, to the best of our knowledge, the only published work on the topic (besides some works by the second-named author [31] , [35] ). Perhaps it was thought by the community to be beyond reach. Stehlé [41] recounts One may wonder if the geometry of "average" LLL-reduced bases is due to the fact that most LLL-reduced bases are indeed of this shape, or if the LLL algorithm biases the distribution. It is hard to decide between both possibilities: one would like to generate randomly and uniformly LLLreduced bases of a given lattice, but it is unknown how to do it efficiently; for example, the number of LLL-reduced bases of a given lattice grows far too quickly when the dimension increases. Here Stehlé is asking whether most LLL bases have RHF ≈ 1.02 or not. This question has been more or less settled by Venkatesh and the second-named author [35] -not by generating LLL bases, but by using the theory of automorphic forms -for the case of the Siegel reduction, which could be considered essentially identical to LLL 1 : Theorem 1 (Kim and Venkatesh [35] ).
2 For any ε > 0, there exists N = N (ε) > 0 such that, in all dimensions n > N , 100 − ε percent of Siegel-reduced bases of 100 − ε percent of n-dimensional lattices in terms of the invariant measure under the action of the unimodular group SL n Z have RHF close to the worst bound ≈ 1.075 by a margin of at most ε.
In other words, most LLL bases (of most lattices) have RHF ≈ 1.075, implying that LLL biases the distribution, and very severely at that. The thesis of the second-named author [31] proves partial results toward Theorem 1 for the actual LLL, and supports it experimentally by revealing the presence of dark LLL bases. The unpublished [34] exhibits even more exotic manifestations of the bias. This series of works establishing the bias of LLL, initiated by Kim and Venkatesh [35] , represents the first serious attempt towards understanding the "Why 1.02" problem.
Yet this discovery has the effect of rendering the situation even more baffling. One would have expected that LLL outputs bases of superior quality because the "bad" ones are a minority, if not rare. However, Theorem 1 and the related results point to the polar opposite scenario: over 99.999 percent of LLL bases are close to being the worst, but somehow LLL manages to dodge all of them and grabs a much better output, always. The obvious question is, how does it do that? 1.2. The importance of the problem (especially) to cryptography. There are a number of excellent reasons to study the 1.02 problem we introduced above: LLL is a fundamental algorithm that forms the foundation of lattice reduction theory, it plays indispensible roles in many other fields of study, the problem has a certain "quirky" appeal, and so on. However, it is via cryptography that this problem carries serious and imminent real-world impact. It is extremely important that the practical behavior of LLL be well-understood in order to determine the ideal security standards that are to replace the current ones -RSA and ECC -in the age of quantum computers, which most experts expect to come within not-so-distant future [24] .
Among several main families of post-quantum cryptosystems, lattice-based cryptosystems are arguably one of the most promising candidates for the next-generation security standards currently considered by the U.S. government. This is supported by the fact that the largest number of cryptoschemes submitted to the recent call for proposals by National Institute of Standards of Technology (NIST) [24] are lattice-based, with 20 out of 69 proposals. The strength of lattice cryptography lies in its efficiency and versatility. Its weakness is often said to be insufficient confidence in its security, in particular the selection of practical secure parameters [7] ; yet there does not seem to exist a written account of what exactly the problem is, and what needs to be figured out. In our opinion, this is not a healthy state of affair. Hence we provide here our version of such an account.
If the gap between the worst-and average-case performances of the LLL algorithm -RHF ≈ 1.075 and ≈ 1.02 -represents some deep knowledge gap of our understanding of lattice reduction algorithms, and if one day such a gap is filled by some breakthrough research or by an accidental discovery, leading to a significant improvement in LLL, that could bring very serious consequences practically. To illustrate the point, imagine that a certain variant of LLL has been invented that performs even better than RHF ≈ 1.02, say 1.005, while retaining its polynomial time complexity. Then very likely almost all the other reduction algorithms would vastly improve as well, since they either directly employ LLL as a subroutine or are inspired by its design, or both. It is not hard to see that, should this happen in reality, every lattice-based cryptosystem will be forced to increase substantially its parameters and lose efficiency, at best lagging behind its competitors in the post-quantum era, and at worst -for example, in case the improved LLL appears after lattice-based schemes have become the standard -jeopardizing the world; no kidding! One may wish to say this is all nonsense, but the problem is precisely that at present there exists no mechanism for arguing that this catastrophic possibility is nonsense: if we made it from 1.075 to 1.02 by dumb luck, then why should not 1.005 be attainable by some clever trick?
It appears that practitioners of lattice-based cryptography are indeed wary of the possibility that lattice reduction algorithms may be significantly improved in the future. According to Tables 5-10 in [5] , most proposed schemes to the recent NIST submissions make rather modest security claims compared to the estimates made with current stateof-art reduction algorithms. Many submissions claim about half or less as many bits of security as estimated by [5] e.g. while a proposal claims their design requires 2 100 bitwise operations to break, the existing algorithms are expected to take as much as 2 200 . If they think that the limits of reduction algorithms are well-understood, there is no need to hedge the bet and sacrifice efficiency. (And again, let us point out that there currently exists no logical argument that doubling security is safe enough.)
To recapitulate, the desired ideal statement in support of lattice-based cryptosystems would be as follows:
Conjecture 2. If one is allowed to spend at most x MIPS of complexity cost on a generic input basis whose entry sizes are bounded by B bits, then one can obtain RHF of at most F (x, B).
The problem of why LLL performs on average RHF ≈ 1.02 corresponds to the base case: it is essentially the problem of how much output quality can be obtained in the shortest possible time. Many cryptologists consider more sophisticated reduction algorithms, such as BKZ [40] , to have been reasonably well-understood (see, for example, [3] , [8] ); paradoxical as it may seem, the case of LLL is thought of as the most mysterious. The best hope, for lattice-based cryptography, is that the nature of the principle underlying this 1.02 phenomenon is such that it is immune to any manipulations for further improvement in RHF without a nontrivial increase in time cost. If this fails to be the case, one must still investigate the extent to which LLL can be improved, since this is directed related to the required parameter sizes of lattice-based schemes, and thereby to their competence -and to which cryptosystem we will be (or not be) using in the future.
1.3. Idea and summary of results. The main contention of the present paper is that the dynamics of the LLL algorithm may be understood as that of a natural variant of the sandpile model from statistical physics, and that most of the mysterious properties of LLL, in fact, turn out to be the familiar properties of the sandpile models. Thereby we are able to provide clear, well-substantiated explanations for the various phenomena involving LLL that were previously considered impenetrable. Our theory is also strong enough to pass a verdict on the security of lattice-based cryptography -turns out, in an affirmative way.
Our work is new in the literature in a number of ways. As done in the previous section, we are the first to explicitly point out the urgency of pursuing a real understanding of LLL. There exist a few results on LLL bases -theoretically possible outputs of the LLL algorithm -such as the worst-case bound from the original paper [20] and Theorem 1 from the recent [35] , but ours is the first work that treats the algorithm itself. Also, there already exist a few other works that suggest connections between lattice reduction algorithms and sandpile models ( [36] , [19] ); however, their sandpiles fail to capture the practical behavior of LLL. On the other hand, the model we propose, LLL-SP (Algorithm 2 below), very closely matches many important aspects of the dynamics of the LLL algorithm.
The two most important contributions of the present paper concern the RHF of LLL. First, using the ideas from the sandpile theory, we are able to explain why, despite Theorem 1 above, LLL almost never outputs a reduced basis of near-worst RHF, resolving the dilemma presented at the end of Section 1.1 above. Second, we provide a compelling argument that it is near impossible to improve the LLL algorithm without incurring a substantial increase in its time complexity. Specifically, our theory indicates clearly that there are only a few feasible approaches for improving LLL, any of which but then requires a lengthy streak of probabilistic miracles. As discussed above, this is a huge relief for lattice-based cryptography.
As a sandpile model, the LLL algorithm is nonabelian, and stochastic in its own way; and we find that it is the stochasticity that plays the main role in shaping the behavior of LLL the way it is. We propose in this paper a certain (abelian) stochastic sandpile model (SSP) that abstracts the stochastic aspect of LLL. Surprisingly, SSP imitates the typical output shape of LLL (from which RHF can be determined immediately). This shows that the geometric series assumption (GSA), yet another unexplained major observation on the behavior of the LLL algorithm, is also a sandpile phenomenon. Moreover, SSP permits a rigorous mathematical theory -first announced in the present paper, worked out in detail in [33] -analogous to that of the original abelian sandpile model [13] , according to which its average "RHF" is a well-defined invariant of its steady state, which is unique. Very likely, this is also the meaning of the number 1.02 of LLL, and this accounts for another folklore curiosity as to why we always have 1.02 regardless of how we sample inputs for the LLL algorithm: it is, so to speak, the only attractor of the system.
To summarize so far, to the question "Why 1.02?", we cannot answer yet why it has to be that particular number, but we can answer why it must be visibly better than the worst bound, why it cannot be made better than what it already is, and why it is always the same number for any kind of inputs.
When it comes to analyzing the time complexity of LLL, our sandpile idea is even stronger. We prove a theorem on the explicit lower bound on the time complexity of LLL-SP, which happens to have the same order of growth as the upper bound from the original LLL paper [20] . Experiments show that this bound is also valid for the actual LLL, suggesting that LLL is unlikely to be improved in the time aspect as well. Another classical question about LLL is whether it remains polynomial-time if its δ-parameter is set to the maximum (see e.g. [2] for a discussion). Based on our framework, we can answer: "Yes" for almost all inputs.
The present paper is part of our ongoing search for a mathematical proof that the average RHF of the LLL algorithm equals ≈ 1.02, and indeed it can be read as our roadmap for such. We must admit that we still have a long way to go. Still, the nearidentical statistical behavior of LLL and its sandpile version LLL-SP, and the superb explanatory power of the sandpile interpretation of LLL, both tested and confirmed from many angles in this paper, serve as strong evidence that we are on the right track.
1.4.
On the sandpile side. The sandpile model is originally introduced by Bak, Tang and Wiesenfeld [4] in order to propose the idea of self-organized criticality (SOC). SOC has been suggested as the potential explanation for the scale-invariance patterns in the magnitude distributions of many natural phenomena, such as earthquakes [18] , forest fires [23] , and firing of the neurons in the human brain [6] [21] , to name a few; recently it has been applied as an optimization strategy as well [29] . However, though we do notice tentative connections here and there, and it would certainly help if they hold (e.g. see the discussions in Sections 3.3 and 4.2 below), for the moment we hold back any claim associating the SOC phenomenon and the LLL algorithm.
Still, we hope part of our work to be of interest to researchers working on sandpile models. Our study of LLL has led us to construct a few natural sandpile models with interesting properties. The steady state of SSP seems to "recognize" the boundaries of the graph, in that the average amount of sand (averaged over recurrent configurations) becomes smaller near the boundaries; this is something that does not happen with ASM, and is not reported to happen for other stochastic sandpile models either. Our interest in this phenomenon comes from the fact that LLL demonstrates exactly the same behavior, not only qualitatively but also quantitatively. See Section 4 below for details.
The model LLL-SP may be thought of as the original sandpile model, plus two natural considerations: i) (this also applies to SSP) the amount of sand that collapses to the neighboring sites could be random, maybe because each sand grain is oval-shaped and it could fall facing different sides causing different outcomes ii) if the difference in the amounts of sand on the neighboring sites is small, then, say by the work of friction or gravity, the amount of sand collapsed also becomes small. The latter is what causes the system to be non-abelian, which makes LLL-SP a great deal more difficult to study mathematically than SSP. We hope more research to be done on non-abelian sandpile models, on which, to the best of our knowledge, there currently exist but a handful of works, and even fewer theoretical works. If the lack of motivation or of interesting objects is one of the reasons, hopefully we have provided some here.
1.5. Organization. In Section 2, we briefly review the basics of LLL and the sandpile theory, and introduce LLL-SP, the sandpile version of LLL. Then we provide robust and extensive experimental evidence that LLL and LLL-SP behave in almost the same manner and very likely operate under the same principles. For the rest of the paper, we explore the consequences of this finding on our understanding of the LLL algorithm. In Section 3, we explain why the average RHF of LLL must be better than the worst-case bound, and why it would be infeasible to improve LLL. In Section 4, we introduce SSP, and extract the lessons that can be learned from it. In Section 5, we study the time complexity of LLL from the sandpile perspective. Finally in Section 6, we give a summary of our results and some closing remarks.
Assumptions and notations.
In order to avoid unrewarding complications, throughout this paper, instead of the original LLL reduction from [20] , we work with the Siegel reduction, a slight modification of the LLL algorithm that is simpler from a theoretical point of view. The Siegel reduction shares with LLL all its idiosyncrasies and open problems mentioned above, except that we would have to change the number 1.02 to 1.03 (but the worst-case bound ≈ 1.075 remains the same). It is widely accepted, by practitioners and theorists alike, that there are no essential differences between the two. In Section 3.3 below, we do consider the original LLL briefly, and that will make it clear that it is also covered by our theory.
n always means the dimension of the pertinent Euclidean space. Our lattices in R n always have full rank. A basis B, besides its usual definition, is an ordered set, and we refer to its i-th element as b i . Denote by b * i the component of b i orthogonal to all vectors preceding it, i.e.
Thus the following equality holds in general:
Throughout this paper, we will write for shorthand
. When discussing lattices, r i := log α i , and when discussing sandpiles, r i refers to the current configuration evaluated at the vertex indexed by i.
2.
Modeling LLL by a sandpile 2.1. The LLL algorithm. We briefly review the LLL algorithm; for details, we recommend [20] , in which it is first introduced. A pseudocode for the LLL algorithm -not necessarily most efficient -is provided in Algorithm 1. In Line 3 therein, we deliberately left the method for choosing k vague.
As mentioned in the introduction, we work with the Siegel variant of LLL in this paper, and Algorithm 1 is a presentation of this Siegel variant. For the original LLL, Size-reduce B.
simply change the inequality in Line 3 to δ b * k
2 (this also allows one to extend the range of δ in Line 0 to any number less than 1). Hence the Siegel variant is only a slight relaxation of the Lovász test for the original LLL.
For our purposes, it is important to know how the basis B changes after swapping two of its neighboring vectors: Proposition 3. After carrying out Step 5 in Algorithm 1, the following changes occur:
and there are no other changes. The superscript "new" refers to the corresponding variable after the swap.
Proof. Straightforward calculations.
Sandpile basics.
We also briefly review the basics of the sandpile models. For references, see Dhar [14] [15] or Perkinson [37] . Some terminologies we introduce below may not be part of conventional vocabulary.
A sandpile model is defined on a finite graph G, with one distinguished vertex called the sink. In the present paper, we only concern ourselves with the cycle graph, say A n , consisting of vertices {v 1 , . . . , v n } and one unoriented edge for each adjacent pair v i and v i+1 . We also consider v 1 and v n as adjacent. We designate v n as the sink.
A configuration is a function f : {v 1 , . . . , v n } → R. Just as reduction algorithms work with bases, sandpile models work with configurations. We write, by abuse of language,
Figuratively, one thinks of r i as the amount or height of the pile of sand placed on v i .
Just as LLL computes a reduced basis by repeatedly swapping neighboring basis vectors, sandpiles compute a stable configuration by repeated toppling. Let T, I ∈ R, usually positive. A configuration is stable if r i ≤ T for all i = n. A toppling operator T i (i = n) replaces r i by r i −2I, and r i−1 by r i−1 +I and r i+1 by r i+1 +I. An illustration is provided in Figure 1 . Applying T i when r i > T is called a legal toppling. By repeately applying legal topplings, all excess "sand" will eventually be thrown away to the sink, and the process will terminate. In our paper, T -threshold -will always be a fixed constant, but I -incrementcould be a function of the current configuration, or a random variable, or both. In the former case, we say that the model is nonabelian -otherwise abelian. In the second case, we say that the model is stochastic. The (non-stochastic) abelian sandpile theory is quite well-developed, with rich connections to other fields such as partial differential equations and algebraic geometry -see [22] for an excellent readable exposition. Other sandpile models are far less understood, especially the nonabelian ones.
2.3. The LLL sandpile model. Motivated by Proposition 3, especially the formulas (i) to (iii) which resemble the toppling operator for sandpiles, we propose the following Algorithm 2, which we call the LLL sandpile model, or LLL-SP for short.
Algorithm 2 The LLL sandpile model (LLL-SP) 0. Input: α 1 , . . . , α n ∈ R, µ 2,1 , . . . , µ n,n−1 ∈ [−0.5, 0.5], a parameter δ < 0.75 1. Rewrite r i := log α i , µ i := µ i+1,i T := −0.5 log δ 2. while true, do: 3.
choose a k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} such that r k > T 4.
if there is no such k, break 5.
(re-)sample µ k−1 , µ k , µ k+1 uniformly from [−0.5, 0.5] 8. Output: real numbers r 1 , . . . , r n−1 ≤ T The only difference between LLL (Algorithm 1) and LLL-SP (Algorithm 2) lies in the way in which the µ's are replaced after each swap, or, in sandpile terminology, after each topple. Our experimental results soon to follow are demonstrations that this change hardly causes any difference in their behavior. A theoretical perspective is discussed at the end of this section.
LLL-SP may seem quite artificial at first glance, due to the formula for the increment I = log
). However, as seen in Figure 2 , log Q i actually has a fairly pretty shape. We suggest that essential features of the behavior of LLL-SP would not change if we replace the increment I by the following simple functions over µ and r, (1)
This gives rise to a natural non-abelian sandpile model. One could think of the shape of I µ (r) as reflecting the work of gravity or friction, say: when r > − log µ, the particles are experiencing a free fall, and when r ≤ − log µ, the low height somehow hampers their movement.
2.4. Numerical comparisons. We present our experiments comparing LLL (Algorithm 1) and LLL-SP (Algorithm 2). We use the parameter δ = 0.749; the closer δ is to 0.75, the stronger the algorithms become, and thus it is customary to set δ close to 0.75. In the description of the algorithms above, we left unstated the method of choosing which pair of vectors to exchange, or which vertex to topple; we intend to try various strategies, since that seems to be the obvious first attempt at improving LLL. In this paper, we use the three most well-known choice algorithms, each of which is interesting in its own way:
• sequential : swap/topple on the lowest index available. This is the method adopted by almost all implementations of LLL.
• random: randomly and uniformly choose an index from those on which swapping/toppling is available, and swap/topple on that index.
• greedy: swap/topple on the index with the greatest increment log Q k . Figure 3 shows the "average shape" of the output bases/configurations by LLL and LLL-SP with respect to these three choice algorithms. More precisely, for each dimension n = 80, 100, 120, and for each algorithm and each choice method, we collected the output of its 5,000 iterations, and computed the average of each r i := log α i , which is what is shown on each plot in Figure 3 . For each dimension, we used the same set of inputs, generated using the standard method suggested in [27] methods of generating inputs, e.g. q-ary lattices, but they all seem to yield identical results.
One easily observes that the algorithms yield nearly indistinguishable outputs. In particular, since RHF can be computed directly from the r i 's by the formula
we expect both algorithms to yield about the same RHF; indeed, Table 1 confirms this. Furthermore, the left-hand side of Figure 4 shows that the RHF distribution of LLL and LLL-SP are in excellent agreement. Some readers may, very reasonably, complain that the agreement in Figure 4 is not as robust for the greedy choice algorithm. The reason has to do with the fact that, the practical distribution of the µ k+1,k 's appearing during LLL is not exactly uniform on [−0.5, 0.5], unlike in the case of LLL-SP. Upon examining Proposition 3, one can see that, for LLL, it tends to be slightly more concentrated near ±0.5. This has the effect of making the increment log Q k a tad bit smaller in general, which explains why LLL-SP always has lower average RHF than does LLL, as can be seen in Table 1 . Since the choice by the greedy version, unlike the other two, is affected by the values of µ's, it reacts more sensitively to this difference. We argue that this apparent small disagreement is not problematic at all, because i) it can be explained ii) the error is predictable, namely ≈ 0.0011 for any dimension, as can be seen in Table 1 iii) the error is still tiny iv) LLL-SP controls LLL, in that the former bounds the latter's performance from below -recall that we do not want LLL to do too well.
Remark. With the observation that the RHF distribution (Figure 4 ) appears as a Gaussian, we can estimate the probability that LLL will yield an RHF < α for a given α ≥ 1, which should be useful for security estimates. It may also be interesting to compare this with the proportion of the LLL bases with RHF < α according to the Haar measure on SL(n, R), which is roughly (α/1.075) n 3 /3 according to [35] .
Remark. At this point already, we can see the usefulness of modeling LLL by a sandpile model. It is not clear at all, from the description of the LLL algorithm (Algorithm 1), how to explain the symmetry of Figure 3 . However, it is immediately obvious for LLL-SP, due to its innate symmetry, namely that reversing the indices in Algorithm 2 does not change the algorithm. The resemblance of the two algorithms runs deeper than on the level of output statistics. See Figure 5 , which depicts the plot of points (i, Q −2 k(i) ) as we ran LLL and LLL-SP on dimension 80 with respect to the three choice algorithms, where k(i) is the index for which i-th swap or topple occurs. The shape of the plots would look the same had we taken different choices of dimensions and inputs; we made our choice so that the data would come in sizes suitable for presentation. The two plots are again indistinguishable, another solid evidence that LLL and LLL-SP have almost identical dynamics. Figure 5 is interesting in many ways. For all three variants, the initial vertical distribution, illustrated by the gradient, repeats itself for most of its runtime. If we increase the determinant of the input, this initial pattern simply repeats itself for a longer time, proportional to an invariant of a basis called energy, which is described below. For the random and greedy versions, we see that different patterns emerge near the end of the algorithm, and according to our experiments, the length of this "tail" part seems to be independent of the input size or energy. From these observations, it is possible to accurately predict the practical running time of LLL. 2.5. Discussion. We have thus far presented plenty of evidence that LLL and LLL-SP behave alike. As said already, their only difference has to do with the way they update the µ k (= µ k+1,k )'s after each swap or topple. For LLL-SP, the dynamics of the µ k -variables are separate from the dynamics of the r k -variables. For LLL, the two dynamics appear to be intermingled in a complex manner, as can be seen in Proposition 3. However, having observed such close similarity of the two algorithms, it is natural to think that the µ k -dynamics of LLL would be, like that of LLL-SP, essentially independent of its r k -dynamics. To put it formally, we propose the following, somewhat informally phrased for the sake of brevity (but it can be easily made mathematically precise) Conjecture 4. Consider LLL with any choice algorithm, and choose a distribution D on the set of bases in R n , to be used to sample inputs for LLL. Define i(k) to be the index where the swapping occurs for the k−th time; thus i(k) is a random variable depending on the choice algorithm and the input distribution. Now one can think of µ i(k) as a random variable. Then, if D is "generic," then (i) (|µ i(k) |) k=1,2,... is "almost strong mixing" as a stochastic process.
(ii) each |µ i(k) | is contained in a compact subset S of the set of all probability density functions on [0, 0.5] with respect to the L ∞ -norm. S is independent of the dimension, the input distribution, or any other variable. This is, so to speak, a technical version of the statement "LLL is essentially a sandpile model." Of course, we could always experimentally demonstrate an even stronger statement (see Figure 6 , for example), but our hope is that some statement of this kind admits a mathematical proof. Our intuition for Conjecture 4 comes from the fact that, the formula µ
, as a function of µ k , is an approximation of the map f (x) = 1/x, and the classical result in ergodic theory that Theorem 5 (Rohlin [38] ). The Gauss map Gx : x → {1/x} is mixing of all orders with respect to the Gauss measure m(x) = 1 log 2 dx 1+x on [0, 1]. Theorem 5 basically means that if G is applied to a measurable set many times, it is dispersed about evenly, in the sense of m. We expect the main difficulty of proving Conjecture 4 would be to render some version of Theorem 5 applicable in our context. The formulas (vi) -(ix) of Proposition 3 are much less of a problem since they are essentially (superpositions of) translations.
Caveat: if one runs LLL on highly non-generic lattices, i.e. those with extremely short first vector, it may impose a non-generic distribution on the µ k 's. In such cases, LLL-SP fails to imitate LLL. This has an implication on the practice of lattice-based cryptography, namely, that (if one wants the benefit of our sandpile analysis) one should use a generic lattice for the scheme, reinforcing the conventional wisdom.
Why LLL can do neither too badly, nor too well
In the last section, we established that the LLL algorithm may be viewed as a sandpile model; our results are simply too robust to be dismissed as coincidence. In this section, we show how to use this idea to resolve the dilemma of why LLL cannot hit a basis of the worst quality if there are so many of them as was proved in [35] . The same idea also explains why it is infeasible to improve LLL by more than a trivial amount -for lattice-based cryptography, it could not have been luckier.
3.1.
Shapes of reduced bases, in terms of sandpile. We briefly discuss the shapes of reduced bases as they appear in the sandpile model -see Figure 7 for an illustration. By the formula (2) for RHF, it is clear that the reduced bases of the worst quality correspond to the configuration where r 1 = . . . = r n−1 = T , the case in which we can keep possible most sand allowed (each r i ) under the condition we impose on the system (the threshold T ). A very theoretically interesting question is first if such a "bad" basis even exists, but the results of [35] show that actually most reduces bases are like that (see Theorem 1 above).
Another important question is what the best bases, i.e. those whose vectors are as short as they can be, should look like; but [32] proved that there exists a constant 0 < c < 1 such that, for almost all lattices in a sufficiently large dimension, they must satisfy r 1 ≈ . . . ≈ r cn ≈ 0, and the common expectation is that this must hold for c arbitrarily close to 1 e.g. see [42] . In general, the smaller the piles, the better the quality, as can be seen from (2).
3.2.
Why not "1.075". We are ready to explain why LLL cannot hit a basis of nearworst quality. The answer is encapsulated in Figure 8 . The coordinate space drawn there represents the space of all configurations {(r 1 , . . . , r n−1 ) : r i ∈ R} ∼ = R n−1 . By the formula (2) for the RHF, the configurations with a given RHF form an affine hyperplane. As shown in the figure, the intersection formed by the set of stable configurations and the set of configurations with RHF > 1.074, say, is very small. On the other hand, the increments taken by LLL tend to be too large to be able to land on that tiny area -it is as improbable as a rambling giant ending up on a designated piece of land two square inches large. According to Theorem 1 above quoted from [35] , that two-square-inches contain Let us stress that this explanation has become possible because, thanks to our work in the previous section, we now have a simplified picture of the dynamics of the µ variables during the runtime of LLL. The complicated change of variables after swapping, shown in Proposition 3, is arguably what has made the LLL algorithm appear so incomprehensible. Our key idea, explained already in Section 2.5 above, is that the changes in µ's are described by highly chaotic formulas, and thus can be separated from LLL as a sub-system independent of its complement. In fact, this is already demonstrated in the monotoneness of Figure 6 -obvious for LLL-SP, not at all so for LLL -the greedy version acting somewhat differently because its choice depends on the µ's, i.e. it rolls the dices first and then decides.
3.3.
Why not "1.005". The same principle also explains why LLL cannot do too well. Bases of high quality, illustrated in Figure 8 as the configurations near the hyperplane RHF = 1.00, lie too deep within, and the increment of LLL is simply not strong enough to reach there.
Why LLL must stop at the particular value of RHF ≈ 1.02 -i.e. could we derive that number mathematically, somehow? -is a difficult question that has to wait for some serious development of a theory of nonabelian sandpiles. For nonabelian sandpiles, it seems difficult prove even the obvious-sounding (although we can provide plenty of numerical demonstrations; see e.g. Figure 9 below) Conjecture 6. Suppose there are two sandpile models A and B on the cycle graph A n , with increments I A and I B respectively, and using the same choice algorithm. If I A stochastically dominates I B , then the average RHF of A is lower than the average RHF of B.
We hope to be able to make progress on Conjecture 6 in a later work; it is always nice to have mathematics confirm our intuitions and observations. There is some possibility that it may be too much to ask for, though, since it is very hard in general to obtain a theorem on cellular automata, simply due to its sheer complexity.
We next discuss the question as to how to improve LLL. More precisely, we consider the existence of an LLL-like algorithm whose RHF is significantly better than 1.02, while of about the same time complexity as LLL. By an LLL-like algorithm, we mean (i) it only uses swapping adjacent vectors as a means of progress, and (ii) the variables µ i,j with i − j ≥ 2 does not affect its next move. In other words, an LLL-like algorithm is an algorithm that only operates on dimension 2 sub-blocks. In particular, deep-LLL is out of our consideration for now.
One idea for improving LLL is to swap below the threshold T , if the increment is positive. This is precisely the original LLL, as opposed to the Siegel version we have been considering. We know already that this does give a small boost to the RHF, from something like ≈ 1.03 to ≈ 1.02. Other than this, the only plausible approach to improving LLL, original or Siegel, is to somehow increase the average size of the increment, at least during some critical stage in the algorithm i.e. increase the arrow lengths in Figure 8 . From the formula of the increment log Q i , this is equivalent to the problem of distorting the distribution of µ k(i) := µ k(i)+1,k(i) , where k(i) is the index for which the i-th swap occurs. There are, apparently, not so many levers one can pull:
(i) Look for a clever choice algorithm.
(ii) Employ some version of backtracking or random tree search.
(iii) Perturb the basis by multiplying it by some element of SL n Z. The greedy version is in fact an instance of (i). It achieves the average |µ k(i) | of about ≈ 0.23, rather than the expected 0.25, explaining why it exhibits a slightly better performance, as shown in Table 1 . One could play with the non-abelian non-stochastic sandpile introduced in the next section to get a rough estimate on the average |µ k(i) | required to attain a given RHF. For instance, for RHF = 1.012 one needs average(|µ k(i) |) ≈ 0.05. This is likely impossible without invoking (ii) or (iii), since there are not so many reasonable candidates of "depth one" choice algorithms, which we suspect is a provable statement (idea: our definition of an LLL-like algorithm severely restricts the kind of words we can use to formulate a choice algorithm).
However, (ii) and (iii) are standard recipes for blowing up complexity. If the sequences of µ k(i) had some exploitable pattern, there might be some hope of cutting down the search time, but the lesson we have just learned from LLL-SP, in particular Conjecture 4, is that there exists no such thing.
(A related speculative comment: if LLL-SP can be shown to have the SOC property, in particular the power-law pattern in the avalanche sizes, we may be able to use it to predict the probability that LLL would perform very well upon adopting perturbation methods like (ii) or (iii), in a manner analogous to how we use SOC to predict the probability of a devastating earthquake or wildfire. Such probability is vanishingly small, and hence it would serve as evidence from physics that lattice-based cryptography is secure.)
Thus far is a sketch of our argument for the improbability of an LLL-like algorithm with a substantially superior RHF-complexity exchange ratio than we currently have. Since the improvability of LLL is a matter of serious real-world impact, we hope to give a more detailed and careful treatment in a forthcoming paper.
3.4.
A variant that perform badly. One often-asked question related to the mystery of LLL is whether one can produce a situation in which an LLL-like reduction algorithm produces a basis of the worst quality. If a basis must be LLL-reduced, our guess is that it is impossible except under some highly contrived settings. However, if we weaken the notion of reduction, e.g. if we only want RHF ≈ 1.075, we are able to propose such an algorithm. More precisely, we propose a reduction algorithm that would yield average RHF → (4/3) 1/4 as n → ∞. To this end we introduce what we will temporarily call the (second) derived model of a sandpile model. Given any sandpile model -be it LLL-SP or SSP -with input r 1 , . . . , r n−1 , denote
If T j , or toppling at site j, with increment I occurs, then
and all other E's stay unchanged. Toppling at j is allowed to occur if and only if (E j − E j+1 )/(n − j) > T . Also observe that RHF = exp(E 1 /n 2 ) and log (energy) = j E j .
3
Algorithm 3 An LLL-like sandpile algorithm outputting worst-case bases 0. Input: n ≥ 2 integer, E 1 , . . . , E n−1 ∈ R 1. while E 1 ≥ n(n − 1)T /2, do: 2. if allowed, apply T 1 (i.e. lines 5 and 6 in Algorithm 2 with k = 1) 3.
if T 2 is allowed, call this algorithm with inputs n − 1, E 2 , E 3 , . . . , E n−1 4. Output:
Our proposed algorithm is presented in Algorithm 3; this is a sandpile model, but the corresponding lattice version should be obvious. The reduction notion is as provided in Line 4 of the pseudocode. The reason that this would yield nearly the worst RHF is that, after the last toppling, one has E 1 ≥ n(n − 1)T /2 − nI last , where I last is the increment taken by the last applied T 1 ; but I last ≤ − log µ last 2,1 has its average bounded by a constant, independent of n. The last said claim is not yet proved for lattices, but all evidence suggests that it is nearly impossible to be otherwise. We could resort to Conjecture 4 above, or we could argue directly as follows: the only way this can go wrong is for the last T 1 to occur when r 1 = Ω(n) and simultaneously µ 2,1 = exp(−O(n)); and since this must be the last T 1 , r 2 needs to be a huge negative number at the same time lest it might topple back on r 1 , which again requires µ 3,2 to be ridiculously small, imposing a similar condition on r 3 , and so on. Besides, we did check by a computer experiment that the lattice version of Algorithm 3 indeed outputs bases of near-worst quality.
Lessons from SSP
There exist other LLL phenomena besides the 1.02 problem of which there have been countless observations but close-to-zero understanding. One such is the geometric series assumption (GSA), first proposed in [39] . GSA refers to the assumption that the α i 's of a reduced basis are all equal to one another, except possibly for those i's close to 1 or n. It is a well-known observation that LLL (and BKZ as well) demonstrates GSA, as also can be seen in Figure 3 above. However, despite being an important part in our understanding of the shape of reduced bases, there has been a complete lack of explanation as to why it must occur; hence the name "assumption."
Another source of curiosity is that the output quality of the LLL algorithm seems to be independent of the kind of input bases we feed into it, as pointed out in e.g. [26] and [27] . This is interesting because it has an implication on how to choose a public key for a lattice-based cryptoscheme: any choice is as secure as any other! Yet it could be potentially dangerous to hastily take advantage of this, unless we have a reason to be sure that it is a general principle, rather than a coincidence on the cases we happened to have encountered so far.
In this section, we demonstrate that both GSA and the independence from input are characteristics of sandpile-like dynamics, by introducing a simple stochastic sandpile model (SSP), which is identical to LLL-SP except that it is abelian. SSP has the same average output shape as LLL, which is practically independent of the method of sampling input configurations. Moreover, SSP admits a mathematical theory, illuminating not only the mechanisms of the two phenomena but also the meanings of the important concepts that have been used to understand LLL, e.g. RHF.
4.1. The case of ASM. In the simplest case of the abelian sandpile model (ASM), in which the increment I > 0 is a fixed constant, there exist notions of the recurrent configurations and the steady state. For details see Dhar [15] ; here we provide quick definitions that are paraphrased to suit our context. A recurrent configuration is a stable configuration that appears as the output from an input of an arbitrarily large "size" e.g. a positive configuration (that is, all r i > 0) with a large amount of total sand r i . The steady state describes the probability that each recurrent configuration would appear, if we were to choose the inputs uniformly randomly from a ball B(C, R) ⊆ (the space of all positive configurations) ∼ = R n−1 >0 of center C and radius R, in the limit as C , R → ∞. By the way, the output of ASM is absolutely independent of the choice algorithm, or equivalently, the order of toppling.
It is a theorem of Dhar [13] that an ASM has a unique steady state, and in that steady state each recurrent configuration has an equal probability of occurring. It is easy to see from the proof that the input does not necessarily have to be sampled from a ball; any distribution representing each coset representative of the tiling construction depicted in Figure 7 of [15] with about equal frequency, e.g. any distribution containing many whole tiles, also induces the same steady state, up to a vanishing error. Let us call such a distribution generic, as it would require deliberate effort to choose an input distribution devoid of that property. In this context, the "independence of input" means that any generic input distribution yields practically the same output distribution, namely the steady state.
An ASM is equipped with the burning algorithm, again due to Dhar [13] , that can quickly compute all the recurrent configurations (actually in our case, we could also do it easily by brute force). It can be used to compute the average output shape, or equivalently the average of each r i over all the recurrent configurations, which turns out to be equal to T − I/2 for all i. One may say that this is the GSA for ASM. However, it is different from the behavior of LLL, since, as seen in Figure 3 , LLL-reduced bases have smaller r i 's for i's near 1 or n − 1.
4.2.
Nonabelian and stochastic sandpiles. LLL-SP differs from ASM mainly in two ways:
• Non-abelian: The increment log Q k depends on r k .
• Stochastic: The increment is a random variable.
The non-abelian aspect does not seem to be responsible for the "curvy" shape of the average output shown in Figure 3 . One can easily test this by modifying Step 7 of Algorithm 2 into 7'. Set µ k−1 = µ k = µ k+1 = ν for some fixed ν ∈ [−0.5, 0.5]. The average output for this variant is shown in Figure 9 . Unlike Figure 3 , one sees that it is flat-shaped, just as in the case of ASM.
We next consider the stochastic aspect. To this end, we introduce a model in Algorithm 4. This is exactly the same as ASM, except for Step 4, which randomly determines the amount of sand to be toppled. The decision to sample from the uniform distribution is an Figure 10 . Average output of SSP, n = 100, I = 100 and T = 400. arbitrary one; we could have chosen something else, and pretty much all the discussions below still apply.
Algorithm 4 Stochastic sandpile (SSP)
0. Input: r 1 , . . . , r n−1 ∈ Z, parameters T, I ∈ Z, I > 0 1. while true, do: 2.
choose a k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} such that r k > T 3.
if there is no such k, break 4.
sample γ uniformly from {1, . . . , 2I − 1} 5.
subtract 2γ from r k 6. augment γ to r k−1 and r k+1 7. Output: integers r 1 , . . . , r n−1 ≤ T The average output shape of this stochastic sandpile model (SSP) is shown in Figure  10 . Figure 10 not only shares all the major characteristics of Figure 3 , but they are also quantitatively alike. The values r i 's are nearly identical in the middle, which gradually decreases as i approaches the boundary, starting at around i = 15 and n−15. Furthermore, in both figures, the differences between the threshold and the middle value, and the differences between the middle value and the boundary value, are equal; in the case of SSP, it is ≈ I/2, and for LLL, it equals about 0.08.
Outside the LLL-sandpile theory we have been building so far, this should come as quite a surprise. Simply place the pseudocodes for Algorithms 1 and 4 side by side and examine them. They look so different that it would be unreasonable to expect that anything similar would come out of them.
We also have experimented with an SSP that samples γ from a discretized exponential distribution, which is closer to what LLL does. We have again observed all the features mentioned in the previous paragraph. The only difference is that, although the relation T −(middle value) = (middle value) − (boundary value) still holds, its value appears to be nothing like half of the average increment -regrettably, we have not yet succeeded in making sense out of it.
Our finding presented in this section is yet another compelling evidence that the LLL algorithm and the sandpiles operate by the same mechanics. It also opens up a path to a deep understanding of that mechanics, since SSP, being abelian, is far more amenable to mathematical investigations than non-abelian systems like LLL-SP. This development, eventually, serves to strengthen even more our argument on the impossibility of improving LLL outlined in Section 3.3, the subject matter whose importance to post-quantum cryptography we cannot emphasize enough.
Remark. Another interesting property of SSP that may be of interest to physicists is that, unlike ASM, it appears to demonstrate the power-law distribution of avalanche sizes in one-dimensional lattices (here the word "lattice" means as in statistical physics, that is, the graph A n ). See [33] for details.
4.3.
A mathematical theory of SSP. A theory of SSP, analogous to that of ASM, has been recently developed by the second-named author [33] , motivated by the experimental result above. Just like ASM, SSP possesses well-defined notions of the recurrent configurations and of the steady state, which is again unique and independent of choice algorithms. Figure 10 is thus a reflection of the steady state of SSP. (This claim is actually provable with computer assistance, provided that the parameters n, T, I are fixed; following the argument of [33] , one can find the values of C and R for which sampling inputs uniformly from B(C, R) would yield an output distribution as close to the steady state as desired.) Though it may be redundant to mention, SSP also has the independence from input property, that is, if the input distribution is generic, then the output distribution is close to the steady state.
However, we still do not know of an analogue of the burning algorithm for SSP, or any method for deriving a formula that describes the average output shape of SSP. In other words, we do not yet have a proof that the average output of SSP in general must obey the descriptions made above. The best we can do at the moment is suggest the following vague idea. When a nontrivial amount of sand is toppled out from r i , some of it must return to r i , since its neighboring piles are being toppled too. However, if i is close to the boundary, the amount of the sand that comes back to r i must be smaller because a large percentage of it is quickly lost to the sink. Especially, if i = 1 or n − 1, half of the sand coming out of r i is immediately lost, which we suspect is the main reason why T − r 1 is twice as large as T − r n/2 . Having found that SSP and LLL generate almost the same output shape, it seems to us that if this is the correct story for SSP, likely it is correct for LLL too.
It would be certainly highly desirable to further extend the concepts of the recurrent configurations and the steady state to the context of non-abelian sandpile models such as LLL-SP. Besides explaining GSA and the independence from input, the "uniqueness" of the steady state further corroborates our argument in Section 3.3 above that perturbation strategies do not help improve LLL. An additional layer of complexity is expected due to the fact that, as observed in Figure 3 earlier, the output distribution of a non-abelian model depends on the choice algorithm, though not by too much. If our approach to LLL via sandpiles is to be worked out mathematically, this and Conjecture 4 would serve as major milestones in a proof that the average RHF of LLL equals ≈ 1.02.
Study of time complexity
We have so far demonstrated in multiple ways that LLL may be interpreted as a sandpile model, and that this interpretation sheds light on many of the folklore conundrums regarding its output statistics in practice. There is still a long way to go until we would become able to declare a quantitative statement, e.g. why the RHF has to be that particular number 1.02, as opposed to 1.04 or 1.01. However, for time complexity, we can readily provide a strong lower bound on the number of topples taken by LLL-SP, regardless of the order of toppling, which we carry out in this section. For an input with log-energy E, we show that LLL-SP must take at least E/2 swaps with high probability, matching the order of the (well-known) upper bound. Experiments verify that this provides a practical lower bound on the number of swaps taken by LLL itself. Our method is applicable to a broad range of LLL-like algorithms, such as Algorithm 3, for which we have the identical lower bound. Therefore our results in this section suggest that LLL likely cannot be improved in time aspect.
In addition, we quickly settle the well-known problem of whether the LLL algorithm with parameter δ = 0.75 also has polynomial-time complexity (currently it is only known for δ < 0.75, due to the original LLL paper [20] ). For LLL-SP, it is immediately obvious that the answer is yes with probability 1 − ε, for any desired choice of ε > 0. With the philosophy of Conjecture 4, it is just as obvious that the same should be true for LLL as well.
5.1.
A lower bound on the cost of LLL-SP. The idea is a quite standard one in the reduction theory literature: use the energy of a basis (or configuration) to estimate the progress of the algorithm. In order to obtain a simple proof, we need to make a certain compromise: we only consider those choice algorithms whose rule does not involve the µ's. Otherwise, the algorithm distorts the distribution of µ in a way that could be difficult to quantify. Hence the theorem below does not cover the greedy LLL-SP; but according to Figure 6 above, for this particular case, the µ's yield a predictable distribution, so the statement may still apply, with possibly a slightly weaker bound.
Theorem 7. Consider LLL-SP, and an input configuration whose log-energy E is not too small, say, at least a large enough constant multiple of (3). Suppose we use a choice algorithm whose rule is independent of the values of the µ's. Then the probability that LLL-SP is not terminated in E/2 steps is at least 1 − CE −1/2 for an absolute constant C > 0.
Proof. If the algorithm is terminated, then E must have become less than
Taking converse, we see that if E is greater than (3), then LLL-SP has not yet terminated. At k-th toppling, E decreases by at most log µ
, where i(k) is the index of the vertex in which k-th toppling occured. If toppled N times, the decrease in E is bounded by at most
gives the lower bound on the probability that LLL-SP is not terminated after N swaps. Hence, it suffices to show that (4) is bounded from below by 1 − CE −1/2 when N = E/2. The central limit theorem is applicable on F N , since µ i(k) are i.i.d. More precisely, we apply the Berry-Esseen theorem, which gives an estimate of the error cost we pay by approximating the distribution of F N by a normal distribution, namely cN −1/2 where c > 0 is an explicit absolute constant. If N = E/2, one can compute, e.g. by the Chebyshev's inequality, that (4) with F N replaced by a proper normal distribution is at least 1 − 5E −1 . But the error term here is subsumed to that of the Berry-Esseen, so that (4) is bounded from below by 1 − CE −1/2 for some constant C > 0, as desired.
Remark. The best thing about Theorem 7 is that the lower bound it provides has the same order of growth as the upper bound, proved in [20] . Also, the factor 1/2 is not optimal, and can be slightly improved with a little more effort.
Since the stable configurations of Algorithm 3 are also subject to the bound (3) on logenergy, Theorem 7 applies to it as well. If an LLL-like algorithm has a reduction notion that is not tied to a well-behaved invariant such as energy, some sandpile-style analysis is still possible, but it seems to depend wildly on the shape of the input.
5.2.
The case of LLL. If Conjecture 4 can be proved, it would imply Theorem 7 for the LLL algorithm itself. Though the implied constant on the number of required swaps could be smaller depending on the analytic properties of the objects involved, we expect the order of the estimate to be the same O(E). The same proof we gave above will more or less go through, since there exists a central limit theorem for strong mixing processes, and (ii) of Conjecture 4 allows bounding the average and the higher moments of F N /N . Experimentally, Theorem 7 for LLL seems to be well-supported. See Table 2 , which compares Theorem 7 to the actual performance of greedy LLL, which takes the lowest number of swaps among the known variants of LLL. The data on the number of swaps taken is excerpted from a work of the second-named author [34] . The numbers in Table  2 are averages rounded to nearest integers over the bases experimented on, generated by the standard method recommended in [27] , but since [34] reports that both the number of swaps and the energy have very small variances, we could take Table 2 as representative of each individual run of LLL. Table 2 clearly indicates that Theorem 7 practically applies to LLL and to its greedy version -which the theorem does not strictly cover -and rather tightly at that. According to [34] , the random version takes nine times as many swaps as greedy, and the sequential version fifteen times.
On improving LLL complexity-wise, our feeling is that there still exists some room for accelerating it by a small constant factor, but not by too much, since O(E) appears to be a reasonable estimate on the number of swaps for any LLL-like algorithm. For a generic input i.e. all E i 's are large in the notation of Section 3.4, its reduced basis in the worst case would likely satisfy E i ≈ (n − i + 1)(n − i)T /2 up to a constant error, since in order to topple out E 1 which is essentially the RHF, E 2 would have to be small enough, for which to happen E 3 would have to be small, and so on. By Theorem 7 this requires with high probability at least E/2 swaps to attain.
5.3.
Complexity of LLL with δ = 0.75. Our suggestion is that the correct perspective on this problem is to think of it in probabilistic terms. Consider the case of LLL-SP first. The problem caused by δ = 0.75 is that, if r i is arbitarily close to T (= 0.5 log δ −1 ) and µ i = 0.5, then toppling at i makes an arbitrarily small progress. However, obviously |µ i | < 0.49, say, for a positive proportion of all topples made by LLL-SP, and thus the increment I is strictly greater than some non-zero number for a positive proportion of the time, or equivalently, LLL-SP makes a solid progress for a positive proportion of all topples it makes. This is enough to prove that LLL-SP with maximal δ successfully terminates in polynomial time with probability arbitrarily close to 1. A failure occurs if µ i ≈ 0.5 for most of the topples, but this is clearly improbable.
If one accepts Conjecture 4, the exact same argument applies to LLL itself, since the conjecture ensures that |µ i | < 0.49 holds for a positive proportion of all swaps made. As with all the other claims we have made in this paper, this is also well-supported by experiments e.g. see Figure 6 (which is made with δ = 0.749 -in practice one avoids setting δ to the maximum because of potential malfunctioning of the algorithm arising from floating-point issues -but does not look much different at all if we made it with δ = 0.75, which we have checked).
Conclusion
In the present paper, we have provided irrefutable evidence that the dynamics of the LLL algorithm behaves nearly identically to that of its sandpile model LLL-SP. Figures 3,  4 , 5, and 6 show just how indistinguishable the two algorithms are. Yet we are not merely claiming that LLL-SP is an excellent copycat of LLL. We are claiming that they behave under the same mathematical, or physical, principles. We consolidate this idea into a theoretical framework by identifying its core components in terms of formal language, e.g. the randomness of µ i(k) (Conjecture 4) and the notions of recurrent configurations and steady state. Our experiments are presented in order to support this framework.
Our theory at once sheds light on most of the well-known folklore mysteries regarding the practical behavior of LLL, for which virtually no mathematical idea, even a tentative guess, has been suggested in the literature so far. It resolves the paradox between Theorem 1 and the practical output quality of LLL. It explains why LLL cannot be improved, without inducing substantial additional cost e.g. deep-LLL and BKZ, to do better than what we had before and have now. This particular point, as elaborated in the introduction, is of foundational importance to lattice-based cryptography -currently one of the most popular family of post-quantum cryptosystems -as it should help us to resolve a fundamental uncertainty concerning the choice of the practical security parameters for all of its members. Furthermore, we show that GSA and the independence from input (of output statistics) are in fact sandpile phenomena, and can be explained from such perspective. Regarding the time complexity of LLL, our theory has even stronger implications: a lower bound as good as anyone could reasonably expect, and the polynomial-time complexity in case δ = 0.75 -a question, like the "Why 1.02" one, that is as old as LLL itself.
Cryptologists sometimes refer to local versus global reductions, a loose intuitive notion that has emerged through experience. The idea, as we see it, is as follows: a local reduction, i.e. an algorithm that makes progress by repeatedly operating on sub-blocks of a fixed low dimension, say β, is limited in strength primarily by the size of β, and any other strategy than increasing β itself leads to marginal improvements at best. In other words, β somehow controls both the RHF and complexity, and as such it can be thought of as an approach to Conjecture 2, the ultimate homework for lattice-based cryptography. But the problem is, how can we make sure that this is indeed the case? Our resolution of the case β = 2 presented in this paper, instantiating a concrete realization of the philosophy, suggests a way forward: the amount of progress made by each local operation -"toppling" -could be modeled as a random variable independent of one another, justified by an analogue of Conjecture 4; and the complex interactions of those local operations is to be investigated from the perspective of statistical physics, a discipline devoted to precisely this kind of phenomenon. Thereby, we hope our paper opens up a new area to build a solid theoretical model for the security analysis of lattice-based cryptography.
